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Checking our Attachment to the Charter
and Respecting Indigenous Legal Orders:
A Framework for Charter Application to
Indigenous Governments
Naiomi Metallic*
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom looms large in our national identity. As a constitutional law professor at a Canadian law school, my experience is that most students and
lawyers see the Charter as intrinsically tied to fundamental notions of justice and fairness
in our country. Because of this, Canadian lawyers and judges, who believe the Charter to be
inherently good, may find it hard to understand why Indigenous peoples resist application of
the Charter to their own institutions. But Canadian jurists’ attachment to the Charter, if not
kept in check, can easily lead to dismissing important objections to its application to Indigenous peoples. I believe both the Yukon Supreme Court (“YKSC”) and the Court of Appeal
(“YKCA”) fell prey to this trap in their reasons in Dickson v Vuntut Gwitchin.1
Ms. Dickson’s Charter challenge has been summarized in the introduction to this special
issue. What I wish to emphasize about the facts, however, is how the Vuntut Gwitchin First
Nation (“VGFN”) resisted Ms. Dickson’s Canadian Charter challenge, maintaining they had
painstakingly developed their own Constitution with individual rights protections and that
recourse to the Canadian Charter was unnecessary.2 While Ms. Dickson had been prepared
to make alternative arguments under the VGFN Constitution, both the YKSC and YKCA
did not consider this argument. Instead, the Yukon courts decided the case exclusively on
* Assistant Professor and Chancellor’s Chair in Aboriginal Law and Policy at the Schulich School of Law,
Dalhousie University, and a member of the Listuguj Mi’gmaq First Nation.
1 Dickson v Vuntut Gwitchin First Nation, 2020 YKSC 22 [Dickson SC]; Dickson v Vuntut Gwitchin First
Nation, 2021 YKCA 5 [Dickson CA].
2 Dickson SC, supra note 1 at paras 61-68, 103-105; Dickson CA, supra note 1 at paras 17-32.
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the Canadian Charter, ignoring VGFN’s plea for respect and deference to their legal order.
Both courts easily concluded that the Charter applied to Ms. Dickson, but that section 25
of the Charter operated to shield the residency requirement from Charter scrutiny to some
extent.
To many, this case represents the opportunity to clarify, as between the ‘shield’ versus
the ‘interpretive’ interpretation of section 25, which is the correct approach. However, both
approaches take Charter application as their starting point.3 Instead of simply tinkering with
the details of the ‘shield’ and ‘interpretive’ approaches to section 25, we need to step back and
interrogate our impulse to impose the Charter on Indigenous governments and then ask what
constitutional principles should inform our discussion on this issue. Imposing the Charter
upon the VGFN without their consent and impervious to their Indigenous legal order in fact
runs afoul of several Charter values and other constitutional principles. Developing a principled framework for considering the Charter’s application to Indigenous governments not only
allows Canadian lawyers and judges to keep their attachment to the Charter in check but presents a more just and flexible approach to considering Charter application to Indigenous governments that is truer to our constitutional aspirations than an approach that blindly imposes
the Charter on Indigenous governments.

The leading problem with automatic Charter application: assimilation
The Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (“TRC”) underscored the
importance of the revitalization of Indigenous legal orders for meaningful reconciliation.
According to the TRC, for Canadian law to cease being a means to subjugate Indigenous
people to an absolute sovereign Crown, it is critical for Indigenous people “to recover, learn,
and practice their own, distinct, legal traditions.”4
From the perspective of reconciliation between Canadian and Indigenous legal orders,
the fundamental question at the heart of this case is: why should the Canadian Charter apply
in this case in the face of VGFN’s objections and their own legal order that includes an individual rights protection regime? Unfortunately, neither the YKSC nor YKCA made any real
attempt to grapple with this question. Neither seemed to seriously entertain the idea that they
could use the provisions in the VGFN’s Constitution to resolve Ms. Dickson’s complaint, even
though this prospect was clearly contemplated within the VGFN Constitution.5
Both courts’ reasons on whether the Charter applied to VGFN’s residency requirement
were brief and based on the proposition that ‘to exist within the Canadian constitutional order
is to accept application of the Charter.’6 Accordingly, ambiguous provisions in the VGFN
3 The ‘shield’ approach does not necessitate automatic Charter application, but the approach to it, applied in
the courts below, does. For more on this, see Amy Swiffen’s article in this special issue.
4 Honouring the Truth, Reconciling for the Future: Summary of the Final Report of Truth and Reconciliation
Commission of Canada (Ottawa: Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, 2015) at 203, 206, 213
[TRC Report].
5 Dickson SC, supra note 1 at paras 63, 112-113 (this is Article IV s 7 of the VFGN Constitution); Dickson
CA, supra note 1 at paras 156-157; Vuntut Gwitchin First Nation Constitution, (2019), online (pdf): <http://
www.vgfn.ca/pdf/constitution%202019.pdf#> [perma.cc/5393-HC6Q].
6 Dickson SC, supra note 1 at paras 110-120, 131; Dickson CA, supra note 1 at paras 88, 97.
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Self-Government Agreement (“SGA”) that were capable of conflicting interpretations on the
point, were read as plainly implying Charter application.7 For example, references in the SGA
about VGFN self-governance respecting and co-existing within the Canadian constitutional
order were circularly taken as implied acceptance of automatic Charter application.8 As I will
develop further below, automatic Charter application does not necessarily flow from VGFN’s
self-governance co-existing within the Canadian constitutional order. Moreover, VGFN’s
refusal to consent to the Charter was viewed as irrelevant; instead, the fact that VGFN did not
explicitly oust the Charter in the SGA was deemed tacit acceptance.9 Next, Supreme Court of
Canada (“SCC”) case law on section 32 of the Charter, taking a broad approach to “government,” was easily extended to include VGFN even though those precedents had never previously been applied to a self-governing First Nation.10 There was no questioning of whether the
context of an Indigenous government exercising inherent self-government, with their own
legal order, changed anything.
Both lower courts approached the Charter application analysis purely as an interpretive
exercise (can/does the Charter apply?) instead of as a normative one (should the Charter
apply?). I believe they did so because their attachment to the Charter prevented them from
seeing the problems with applying it to Indigenous governments.
There is no getting around the fact that applying the Charter to the VGFN without their
consent and heedless of their established legal order,11 is a form of assimilation. While the
lower courts may not have intended it as such, the decision to automatically impose the Charter on VGFN in the circumstances is reminiscent of darker chapters of our history where
Canadian decision-makers forced Euro-Canadian ideas, processes, and institutions on Indigenous peoples.12 While some of the law-makers who imposed these policies might have done
so out of hatred towards Indigenous peoples, the vast majority likely did so out of paternalistic
and misguided beliefs that they were ‘helping’ Indigenous peoples. While well-intentioned,
what lies behind such intentions, nonetheless, are racist assumptions that Indigenous ideas,
processes, and institutions are somehow backwards or inferior and incapable of sustaining the
well-being of Indigenous communities. Reports like that of the TRC and many others teach us
that such beliefs couldn’t have been more wrong. The imposition of Western ideas, processes
and institutions on Indigenous peoples has had disastrous consequences for Indigenous identities, cultures and well-being.13 To avoid repeating the mistakes of the past, Canadian judges
must be alive to the fact that forcing Canadian ideas on Indigenous peoples cannot continue,
even those in our beloved Charter.

Dickson SC, supra note 1 at paras 110-113.
Ibid.
Ibid at paras 118-119.
Ibid at paras 121-128; Dickson CA, supra note 1 at para 98.
Dickson SC, supra note 1 at paras 112, 131 (YKSC does hold that VGFN Constitution remains in effect
and concurrent, however, the court’s approach is to effectively give the Charter paramountcy in the
circumstances with little explanation or justification).
12 There are too many examples to list, but among the more notorious are the imposition of the Indian Act,
residential schools, and Canadian child welfare laws on Indigenous peoples.
13 See, in general, TRC Report, supra note 4.
7
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Learning from past mistakes
Discussions about how imposing the Charter on Indigenous government is assimilative are
not new. The question of whether the Charter ought to automatically apply to exercises of
Indigenous self-government was a major source of contention during the Charlottetown negotiations. In her article on events surrounding the Charlottetown Accord, Mary-Ellen Turpel
effectively summarizes the reasons for Indigenous opposition to the Charter:
Aboriginal organizations, and especially First Nations leaders, had argued for some time that the
Charter does not represent their value systems because it does not embrace social and economic justice,
nor does the litigation style of rights redress suit their history and traditions. The Charter, with its
preface recognizing the supremacy of God and its emphasis on individual rights instead of individual
responsibilities (a First Nations approach) was always rejected by First Nations. It was developed without
First Nations input in 1981 and over objections to concepts and principles that were either too limited
for Aboriginal communities or just outside their traditions and cultures (for instance, the model of
taking human-rights disputes to court instead of to Elders or using other dispute-resolution processes
that are traditional part of an Aboriginal community.)14

Turpel describes the various problematic threads of public reaction to Indigenous resistance
to the Charter. Some reflected paternalistic beliefs that “they knew what was best for Aboriginal peoples.”15 Some were affronted at the very idea that Indigenous people rejected ideas they
saw to be of universal appeal. Others rejected the proposition that Indigenous people should
be allowed to operate under standards different from other Canadians.
As recounted by Turpel, during the Charlottetown negotiations, some (but not all) Indigenous women’s organizations raised alarms that having Indigenous governments operating
outside the Charter would be licence to undermine the rights of Indigenous women.16 While
recognizing the legitimacy of this concern, due in no small part to gender discrimination
imposed on First Nations by the Indian Act, Turpel also explains how the issue was oversimplified as a basis to resist Indigenous self-government:
Gender-equality concerns are legitimate, but they are interwoven with cultural and racial oppression
that has been imposed upon Aboriginal people. To see only the gender aspect is, unfortunately, to miss
the bigger picture of how we get out of this oppression that has been the legacy of Canadian dominance
of Aboriginal peoples. Also, to insist on the same ideas of gender equality in Aboriginal society as may
pertain in Canadian society is another form of dominance, in my view, when many Aboriginal systems
demand a much more central role for women than in the mainstream government.17

Turpel further explains how some non-Indigenous groups seemed to used gender discrimination concerns as a pretext to mask racist beliefs about Indigenous inferiority and double standards in relation to Indigenous governments:
… the extent to which gender-equality concerns were focused upon by non-Aboriginal people during
the campaign raises a different point for me. The level of scrutiny of Aboriginal governments and the
expectations of perfection by non-Aboriginals in all aspects of governance is so outrageous that no
14 Mary-Ellen Turpel, “The Charlottetown Discord and Aboriginal Peoples’ Struggle for Fundamental Political
Change,” in Kenneth McRoberts & Patrick J Monahan, eds, The Charlottetown Accord, the Referendum, and
the Future of Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993) 117 at 135 [Turpel].
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid at 132-135.
17 Ibid at 134.
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Aboriginal government would ever satisfy these expectations … This is a clear double standard, since
Canadian governments govern despite the fact that the ideals of gender equality, Charter protection,
and social justice for all are far from realized in dominant society. Underlying this opposition to selfgovernment is an expectation that Aboriginal peoples must perfect their societies before they will be
‘permitted’ to govern and that, prior to that point, the far-from-perfect dominant society is entitled to
control Aboriginal communities.18

Ultimately, the conflict over the Charter led the Indigenous negotiators to compromise by
accepting Charter application to self-government within the Charlottetown Accord, but this
came with some concessions from First Ministers as well. The Charter would be amended to
“apply immediately to governments of Aboriginal people,” but section 25 would be strengthened to state that “nothing in the Charter abrogates or derogates from Aboriginal, treaty or
other rights of Aboriginal peoples, and in particular any rights or freedoms relating to the
exercise or protection of their languages, cultures or traditions.” Finally, section 33 would
be amended to clarify that Aboriginal governments could also invoke the notwithstanding
clause.19
Returning now to the Yukon courts’ decisions, having just revisited the controversy and
trade-offs negotiated around Charter application in the Charlottetown Accord negotiations, it
is difficult not to dwell on the lack of discussion around this controversy in the courts’ reasons,
or what to do in the absence of the negotiated trade-offs (e.g., if finding the VGFN is within
section 32, do we read them into section 33 as well?). Some thirty years since, this history ought
to inspire circumspection over Charter application to Indigenous governments, yet the courts
below reached their conclusion readily.

Why the Yukon courts’ approach to section 25 is a problem
I could be accused of overstating my point about assimilation, given that both lower courts
used section 25 of the Charter as the means to attempt to resolve VGFN’s concerns about the
Charter’s impact on their culture and governance system.20 While I believe the courts were
well-intentioned in this regard, the way section 25 was applied in the case did little to demonstrate genuine respect for VGFN as a government. In fact, this approach risks perpetuating
exactly the kinds of stereotypes and double standards about Indigenous governments identified by Turpel.
With minor variations, the approach of both the YKSC and YKCA seemed to be premised on the Charter applying to Indigenous governments in all cases, but, for certain exercises of Indigenous jurisdiction, at some point in the Charter analysis, section 25 will shield
the exercise of Indigenous jurisdiction from further Charter scrutiny. Both courts held that
section 25 was triggered because the residency requirement had a ‘constitutional character’
(although both questioned whether ‘constitutional character’ was an appropriate or even
binding threshold21). Despite finding that section 25 shielded the residency requirement, the
18 Ibid at 134-135.
19 Canada, Privy Council, Consensus Report on the Constitution: Final Text, Catalogue No CP22-45/1992E
(Charlottetown: PC, 28 August 1992).
20 Dickson SC, supra note 1 at paras 114, 176, 193, 199; Dickson CA, supra note 1 at paras 143-161.
21 Dickson SC, supra note 1 at paras at 191, 194, 207; Dickson CA, supra note 1 at para 147.
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YKSC nonetheless conducted a full section 15 Charter analysis (finding the residency requirement was not a prima facie violation of Ms. Dickson’s equality rights except for the 14-day
time period to move), followed by an Oakes inquiry and “reading down” the 14-day residency
requirement.22 Likewise, despite finding that section 25 shielded the residency requirement,
the YKCA engaged in a deep Charter analysis, concluding, contrary to the YKSC, that the residency requirement constituted a prima facie infringement of Ms. Dickson’s equality rights.23
Further, while stating that an Oakes analysis was unnecessary because of the finding that the
residency requirement was ‘shielded’ the YKCA nonetheless hinted that, but for the shield, the
infringement might not pass Oakes.24
On both approaches to section 25, VGFN was subjected to having its legal order intensely
scrutinized by standards foreign to it. Imagine the laws of Canada scrutinized under the legal
standards of Bahrain or vice versa. This does not happen to other governments. In customary
international law, sovereign states are immune from the jurisdiction of foreign courts, except
where the state consents to jurisdiction or has breached international law.25 Alongside this, Canadian courts have adopted an interpretive principle known as ‘comity’ and it has been described
as “the deference and respect due by other states to the actions of a state legitimately taken within
its territory.”26 In R v Hape, a majority of the SCC was unwilling to undertake Charter scrutiny of
the activities of RCMP officers conducting an investigation of a Canadian in the Turks and Caicos Islands as this would indirectly entail scrutinizing that country’s laws and processes under
Canadian Charter standards, which would run afoul of the principle of comity. Unless there was
evidence that the investigation violated international law, Canadian courts “must respect the
way in which the other state chooses to provide the assistance within its borders.”27
While Indigenous governments are not seen as foreign sovereigns in Canada,28 nor are they
simply subordinate, or even analogous, to Canadian governments. They are sui generis governments and, as such, entitled to respect and deference in the exercise of their jurisdiction.29 In
the United States, the status of tribes as ‘domestic dependent sovereigns,’ with their jurisdiction
predating the formation of the country, has resulted in court rulings that tribal governments
are outside the scope of the American Constitution and its individual rights protections provisions.30 However, the Yukon courts gave little consideration how the nature of VGFN, as a
formally self-governing nation, influenced the level of respect shown to its legal order.31
Dickson SC, supra note 1 at paras 132-171.
Dickson CA, supra note 1 at paras 107-113.
Ibid at para 116.
R v Hape, 2007 SCC 26 at paras 41, 43 [Hape].
Morguard Investments Ltd v De Savoye, [1990] 3 SCR 1077 at 1095, 52 BCLR (2d) 160.
Hape, supra note 25 at para 52.
See Beaver v Hill, 2018 ONCA 816 at para 17.
Canadian Pacific Ltd v Matsqui Indian Band, [2000] 1 FC 325 at paras 29, 44, 176 DLR (4th) 35 [Canadian
Pacific Ltd]; Taypotat v Taypotat, 2013 FCA 192 at para 36 [Taypotat]; Pastion v. Dene Tha’ First Nation,
2018 FC 648 at paras 21-29 [Pastion]; Ontario Lottery and Gaming Corporation v Mississaugas of Scugog
Island First Nation, 2019 FC 813 at paras 49-51 [Ontario Lottery and Gaming]; Anderson v Alberta, 2022
SCC 6 at para 28 [Anderson].
30 See Kent McNeil, “Aboriginal Governments and the Charter: Lessons from the United States” (2002) 17:2
CJLS 73.
31 For more on this see Kate Gunn, “Towards a Renewed Relationship: Modern Treaties & the Recognition of
Indigenous Law-Making Authority” (2022) 31.2 Const Forum Const 17.

22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
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Further, and most damagingly, the intense Charter scrutiny to which the VGFN residency
requirement was subjected unwittingly feeds into the stereotypes of Indigenous governments
as backwards, prone to violate human rights and unable to govern themselves. But this is an
unfair comparison; different nations can have different norms. Our courts realize that it is
both misleading and disrespectful to subject other governments to such scrutiny under Canadian norms and so refrain from doing so as much as possible through the doctrine of sovereign immunity and the principle of comity (barring breaches of international law). Yet we
don’t question the propriety of doing this when it comes to Indigenous governments, which
suggest a double-standard.

Automatic Charter imposition as an infringement of Aboriginal rights
An alternative lens that also underscores the problem here is analyzing the issue under section
35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, through the Sparrow framework.32 Under this framework,
a government action or law infringes an Aboriginal right where it imposes an unreasonable
limitation upon the right, imposes undue hardship on the Indigenous group or denies them
of their preferred means of exercising the right.33 In a recent reference decision, the Quebec
Court of Appeal suggested that federal legislation subjecting the inherent Aboriginal right to
self-government to automatic Charter applications is a clear infringement, which would have
to be justified on the Sparrow framework in future challenges in specific cases.34
To justify an infringement of an Aboriginal right, in addition to consulting, a government
must demonstrate that it pursued a valid objective that reconciles the Aboriginal group’s interests with society’s broader interest, and that it tried to achieve this objective respectful of the
fiduciary obligations of the Crown. To prove the latter, governments must satisfy an Oakes-like
proportionality framework that is also imbued with specific considerations for the Indigenous
context, including not only proving as little infringement as possible, but having given priority
to the Aboriginal right and not adopting unstructured regulatory regimes.35
I believe this a helpful framework for considering Charter application to the VGFN in a
more principled way than how it was approached in the lower courts. First and foremost, this
requires seeing the automatic imposition of the Charter on the VGFN as an infringement of
their inherent right to self-government. VGFN steadfastly resisted agreeing to Charter application in their negotiations, thus automatic Charter imposition denied them their preferred
means of exercising their right. Forcing the Charter on the VGFN, even with section 25 operating as a shield, imposes undue hardship on VGFN as its application is assimilative, dismissive
of VGFN’s individual rights protection regime within its Constitution. It also subjects VGFN’s
legal order to unfair comparisons to the Canadian legal order that feed into stereotypes about
Indigenous inferiority and inability to govern themselves. For all of these reasons, automatic
32 See R v Sparrow, [1990] 1 SCR 1075, 46 BCLR (2d) 1.
33 Ibid at 1111-1113.
34 Renvoi à la Cour d’appel du Québec relatif à la Loi concernant les enfants, les jeunes et les familles des Premières
Nations, des Inuits et des Métis, 2022 QCCA 185 at paras 518, 520, 528-529.
35 For a summary of the law here, see Peter W Hogg & Daniel Styler, “Statutory Limitation of Aboriginal
or Treaty Rights: What Counts as Justification” (2015) 1:1 Lakehead LJ 3. On unstructured discretionary
regimes, see R v Adams, [1996] 3 SCR 101 at para 51, 138 DLR (4th) 657 [Adams]; R v Marshall, [1999] 3
SCR 456 at paras 62-64, 177 DLR (4th) 513 [Marshall].

Constitutional Forum constitutionnel

9

Charter application is an unreasonable limitation on VGFN’s right to self-government. Thus,
justification becomes necessary.
Here we are dealing with judge-made law rather than legislation or executive action. Nonetheless, since the Yukon courts’ decisions infringe an Aboriginal right, the judges’ (discretionary) decisions here ought not to be left unstructured — a framework for exercising such discretion is needed.36 In the administrative law context, Baker holds that discretionary decisions
ought to be exercised considering, among other things, the fundamental values of Canadian
society, the principles of the Charter, and international law.37 In the Charter context, judgemade decisions must account for ‘Charter values.’ This calls on courts to identify the objectives
or underlying values behind a potentially Charter-infringing decision and then engage in a
proportionate weighing of these objectives and values against the Charter protections at play.38
This has been called the ‘Charter values’ or Doré framework. The SCC has emphasized that
this analysis is a “robust one” and “works the same justificatory muscles” as the Oakes test.39
I am proposing the development of a similar analytical framework to be used here but
adapted to the Sparrow framework. This requires judges faced with imposing the Charter on
Indigenous governments to identify the objectives or values in favour of applying the Charter
and weighing them against competing objectives and values at play.40 Consistent with Baker,
these objectives can also be based on fundamental values of Canadian society, the principles
of the Charter and section 35, and international law. These competing objectives would have
to be weighed with an eye to proportionality as well the fiduciary nature of the relationship
between Canada and Indigenous peoples.

Applying the adapted Sparrow framework to the VGFN
I will start by identifying the principles in favour of applying the Charter. From my reading of the Yukon cases, as well as the concerns canvassed by Turpel, these are: 1) section 52 of
the Constitution Act, 1982 necessitates Charter application; 2) fear of a legal vacuum; and 3)
specific equality concerns. I will discuss each in turn and simultaneously identify and weigh
the competing objectives and principles at play.

36
37
38
39
40
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Ibid.
Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 SCR 817, 174 DLR (4th) 193.
See discussion in Doré v Barreau du Québec, 2012 SCC 12 at paras 25-58 [Doré].
Ibid at para 5; Loyola High School v Quebec (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 12 at para 40.
While I am proposing this analysis for the VGFN, a formally self-governing First Nation, this framework
could apply to all Indigenous governments. Across the board, this provides a more just and flexible approach
than imposing the Charter automatically. Distinctions between inherent and delegated jurisdiction, for
these purposes, are arbitrary. Our courts have been clear that exercises of self-government, including both
delegated or inherent are worthy of respect and deference: see Canadian Pacific Ltd, supra note 29 at paras
29, 44; Taypotat, supra note 29 at para 36; Pastion, supra note 29 at 21-29; Ontario Lottery and Gaming,
supra note 29 at paras 49-51; Anderson, supra note 29 at para 38. Under a reconciliation lens, it must be
recalled that ‘delegated’ forms of jurisdiction have, for much of our history, been the only type of selfgovernment on offer from governments and the courts, with Indigenous governments having little say in
the matter. To limit this framework to inherent exercises of jurisdiction, would operate to stifle the exercise
and development of Indigenous legal orders.
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1) Section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982 necessitates Charter application
Section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982 says that the Constitution is the supreme law of
Canada. Ms. Dickson emphasized this provision in her submissions,41 and the Yukon courts
emphasized section 52 in finding that the Charter applied to VGFN.42 While not expressly
explained in the cases below, I assume the reasoning to be that because the Constitution is the
supreme law of Canada, this necessitates Charter application to VGFN.
In interpreting section 52, it bears recalling that our written Constitutional documents
are drafted at the level of principle, not as prescriptive rules. Further, the various principles in
the Constitution can sometimes be in tension with each other and the role of the courts is to
attempt to harmonize these tensions so that each provision can be interpreted to the fullest
extent possible while coexisting with the rest of the Constitution. Interpretations that privilege
one constitutional provision (or even an entire section of the Constitution) while disregarding
another are suspect.43 Section 52 does not prescribe that the Charter (Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982) must apply in full force; that is only a possible interpretation — and one that is
suspect. To read it as such, in the case of a self-governing Indigenous nation with a legal order
that includes an individual rights protection mechanism, privileges the Charter over Part II
of the Constitution Act (Aboriginal rights), disregards the plain wording of section 25 of the
Charter, and is in tension with section 15 of the Charter, as well as several unwritten constitutional principles, including the rule of law, federalism and protection of minorities, as I will
discuss below.
A variant of this first argument is the ‘equality-for-all argument’ — that the Charter ought
to apply to everyone in Canada equally. This was an argument that some members of the
public found persuasive at the time of the referendum on the Charlottetown Accord in 1992.44
The problem with this argument, however, is that it relies on an outdated notion of equality — formal equality — which has long been discarded in favour of substantive equality.45
The principle of substantive equality respects and celebrates difference, recognizing that all
human beings are equally deserving of concern, respect and consideration. In cases involving
services provided to Anglophone and Francophone communities, the SCC has affirmed that
substantive equality can mean distinctive content in the provision of similar services, depending on the nature and purpose of the services in issue, and the population served.46 In Ewert
v. Canada, about corrections services to Indigenous peoples, the SCC held that it is a “longstanding principle of Canadian law that substantive equality requires more than simply equal
treatment.”47
41 Dickson SC, supra note 1 at para 52.
42 Ibid at para 131; Dickson CA, supra note 1 at para 98 (reasoning adopted by YKCA).
43 This is known as the doctrine of mutual modification: see Citizens Insurance Company v Parsons (1881), 7
AC 96 (PC), aff ’g (1880), 4 SCR 215. See Peter W Hogg & Wade Wright, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th
ed (Canada: Carswell, 2007) at 36-23.
44 Turpel, supra note 14 at 138.
45 See Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 SCR 143 at 166, 56 DLR (4th) 1; R v Kapp, 2008
SCC 41 at paras 15-16; Fraser v Canada (Attorney General), 2020 SCC 28 at paras 25-50.
46 See DesRochers v Canada (Industry), 2009 SCC 8; Association des parents de l’école Rose-des-vents v British
Columbia (Education), 2015 SCC 21.
47 Ewert v Canada, 2018 SCC 30 at para 54.
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In a human rights decision about the chronic underfunding of child and family services
provided to First Nations by Canada, the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal maintained that
substantive equality means that First Nations children and families are not simply entitled to
funding and services mirroring provincial standards, but are entitled to funding and services
that “consider the distinct needs and circumstances of First Nations children and families …
including their cultural, historical and geographical needs and circumstances.”48 The Tribunal
also made findings about the imposition of laws on First Nations as assimilative. Commenting on how the federal government imposed provincial child welfare laws upon First Nations
people, the Tribunal compared Canada’s approach to child welfare to its approach to residential schools: “[s]imilar to the Residential Schools era, today, the fate and future of many First
Nations children is still being determined by the government. . . .”49 The Tribunal made it clear
that systems that perpetuate historic disadvantage and assimilation endured by Indigenous
peoples, including the imposition of laws and standards that do not meet their needs and
circumstances, are discriminatory and have no place in Canada. I have argued that, without
going so far as explicitly saying so, the Tribunal suggested a strong connection between First
Nations’ substantive equality rights and their right to self-government.50 Stated otherwise,
“autonomy means the right of being different.”51
The above discussion reveals that appeals to formal equality to support the imposition of
the Charter on VGFN are unpersuasive and outdated. Respecting Indigenous peoples’ right
to substantive equality means respecting their governments’ right to be different from the rest
of Canada, including to have different laws and institutions from the Canadian legal system if
they so choose.
Likewise, appeals to the ‘rule of law’ as meaning ‘identical rules for everyone’ suffers similar problems. ‘Rule of law’ has many varied, textured meanings.52 However, one interpretation our courts have cautioned against is construing it to mean that the Canadian legal order
is the only legal order in the country, excluding or minimizing the existence of Indigenous
legal orders.53 Canada is a legally pluralistic nation, recognizing both common and civil law
with the growing resurgence of Indigenous legal orders. As argued by John Borrows, “[t]he
culture of law is weakened in the country as a whole if Indigenous peoples’ legal traditions are
excluded from its matrix.”54
48 First Nations Child and Family Caring Society of Canada v Attorney General of Canada (for the Minister of
Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, [2016] 2 CNLR 270 at para 465, 83 CHRR 207 (CHRT).
49 Ibid at para 426 [emphasis added].
50 Naiomi Metallic, “A Human Right to Self-Government over First Nations Child and Family Services and
Beyond: Implications of the Caring Society Case” (2018) 28:2 J L Soc Pol’y 4 at 30-34.
51 Bruce Ryder, “The Demise and Rise of the Classical Paradigm in Canadian Federalism: Promoting
Autonomy for the Provinces and First Nations” (1991) McGill LJ 308 at 341 citing Louis-Phillippe Pigeon,
“The Meaning of Provincial Autonomy” (1951) 29:10 Can Bar Rev 1126 at 1133.
52 Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 SCR 217 at paras 70-78, 161 DLR (4th) 385 [Reference re Secession].
53 See Henco Industries Limited v Haudenosaunee Six Nations Confederacy Council, (2006) 277 DLR (4th) 274
at paras 140-142, 2006 CarswellOnt 7812 (Ont CA); Frontenac Ventures Corporation v Ardoch Algonquin
First Nation, 2008 ONCA 534 at paras 41-47.
54 John Borrows, Canada’s Indigenous Constitution (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010) at 122. See
also Kent McNeil, “Indigenous Law, the Common Law, and the Pipelines,” (8 April 2021), online (blog):
ABlawg <https://ablawg.ca/2021/04/08/indigenous-law-the-common-law-and-pipelines/> [perma.
cc/54M5-FPT9].
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Further, interpretation of the rule of law as privileging one legal order to the exclusion of
another is in tension with our constitutional principles of federalism. In Reference re Secession
of Quebec, the SCC linked the principle of federalism with respect to the protection of distinct
cultural and political traditions. While the Court’s discussion was specifically in relation to
our common and civil law traditions, scholars have argued that Indigenous groups have a
similar claim that federalism supports their autonomy in governance given the important goal
of protecting their distinctive cultural and political traditions.55 In support of this, the federal
government recognizes that Indigenous self-government is part of Canada’s evolving system
of cooperative federalism.56 Moreover, the rights to Indigenous self-determination and selfgovernment are also recognized in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, which has now been affirmed “as a universal international human rights instrument
with application in Canadian law.”57
Finally, interpretation of the rule of law as privileging one legal order also runs afoul of
the constitutional principle of respect for minorities. Building on their findings in relation to
federalism, the SCC in Ref re Secession observed that the protection of minority rights was an
essential consideration in the constitutional structure at the time of Confederation, and that
principle was further reflected in provisions in the Constitution Act, 1982, including section
25 and section 35.58 Thus, in interpreting the meaning of section 52, these provisions must be
taken seriously. Respecting them, and balancing them with the provisions in the Charter, may
mean not applying provisions in the Charter to an Indigenous government.
From the foregoing, it is easy to see that this first principle supporting Charter application
to the VGFN is outweighed by a lengthy list of competing objectives and values.
2) Fear of a legal vacuum
Another objective that may weigh in favour of imposing the Charter over an Indigenous government is the fear that failing to do so would create a legal vacuum. There is SCC precedent
for the desire not to create a legal vacuum being a judicial objective.59 Further, in a case about
a First Nation exercising jurisdiction under the Indian Act, the Federal Court of Appeal cited
concerns about creating “jurisdictional ghetto[s]” if the Charter was not applied.60 This reasoning is a problem, however, if it simply assumes Indigenous groups are lawless. Each Indigenous nation has its own legal traditions.61 However, owing to the impacts of colonialism,
different groups are at different stages of revitalizing and implementing their legal orders.
Thus, the fear of a ‘legal vacuum’ is valid only if the group in question is not currently drawing
on its own legal order. Further, evidence of an Indigenous legal order does not consist merely
of statutes or regulations. Indigenous laws can take forms with which Canadian judges may
55 Ryder, supra note 51 at 319-230; Borrows, supra note 54 at 125-128.
56 Canada, Department of Justice, Principles Respecting the Government of Canada’s Relationship with
Indigenous Peoples, (monograph), Catalogue No J2-476/2018E-PDF (Ottawa: Department of Justice,
2018)., principle 4.
57 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Act, SC 2021, c 14, s 4(a).
58 Reference re Secession, supra note 52 at paras 79-82.
59 See, for example, Canadian Western Bank v Alberta, 2007 SCC 22 at para 44.
60 Taypotat, supra note 29 at para 39; Dickson CA, supra note 1 at para 86 (this was cited with approval by the
CA).
61 See, in general, Borrows, supra note 54.
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not be familiar. Mistaking these for ‘legal vacuums’ would be privileging those Indigenous
legal orders that resemble the Canadian legal order, which once again risks imposing EuroCanadian legal norms on Indigenous peoples.62
Judges in Canada are becoming increasingly attuned to the fact that they have a ‘duty to
learn’ and a ‘duty to act’ in relation to Indigenous legal orders, and this should aid in preventing such mistakes.63 Moreover, there are a variety of different ways that information and
evidence about Indigenous legal orders can be brought before a court to aid their understanding.64 Of course, where an Indigenous group has designated a court, tribunal or other
alternative dispute resolution process that can hear an individual’s complaint, adjudication
through these bodies ought to be prioritized over hearings in Canadian courts congruent with
the priority/minimality impairment considerations pursuant under the Doré-adapted Sparrow framework.65
In the case of the VGFN, there is no issue of a legal vacuum since the nation is clearly
drawing on its own legal order. Therefore, this is not a legitimate basis for imposing the Charter in the circumstances.
3) Individual equality concerns
Like other governments in Canada, Indigenous governments can discriminate against their
citizens. Much of that discrimination can be linked to the imposition of the Indian Act, however, and the resource-scarcity brought on by the provision of inadequate land bases and
chronic underfunding of essential services to First Nations by the Canadian government.
Given the patriarchal and racist roots of the Indian Act, this has often manifested as intersectional discrimination against Indigenous women.66 While this issue bubbled to the surface
in the early 1990s due to amendments to the Indian Act in 1985 to address long-standing
gender-discrimination in the Act, problems of discrimination within Indigenous communities remains today.67

62 See Borrows, ibid at 142-149, 178-179.
63 Former CJC McLachlin has called for “all members of the judiciary” to have access to education and materials
about Indigenous legal traditions: see Former CJC Beverley McLachlin, Address (delivered at the CIAJ
Annual Conference: Aboriginal Peoples and Law: “We Are All Here to Stay”, Saskatoon, 16 October 2015),
online: CIAJ <https://ciaj-icaj.ca/wp-content/uploads/documents/2015/10/916.pdf?id=472&1642525341>
[perma.cc/9246-AKML]; see also Lance Finch, “The Duty to Learn: Taking Account of Indigenous Legal
Orders in Practice” (2012) online: CLE BC Materials <https://www.cerp.gouv.qc.ca/fileadmin/Fichiers_
clients/Documents_deposes_a_la_Commission/P-253.pdf>, [perma.cc/E7KV-69XH]; see also Robert
J Bauman, “A Duty to Act” (delivered at CIAJ Annual Conference: Indigenous Peoples and the Law, 17
November 2021), online: Court of Appeal for British Columbia <https://1juibf12bq823l3a7515u1i5wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/A_Duty_to_Act_-CJ-BAUMAN-_-Indigenous_
Peoples_and_the_Law.pdf> [http://perma.cc/H6H9-U5WC].
64 Naiomi Metallic, “Six Examples Applying the Meta-Principle Linguistic Method: Lessons for Indigenous
Law Implementation,” (2021) UNBLJ Working Paper.
65 See Linklater v Thunderchild First Nation, 2020 FC 1065 at paras 48-55.
66 Canada, Reclaiming Power and Place: The Final Report of the National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered
Indigenous Women and Girls, vol 1a (Ottawa, 2019) (Chief Commissioner: Marion Buller) [“MMIWG Final
Report”].
67 Ibid.
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This concern is likely the strongest argument for the application of the Charter to Indigenous governments, and it rests in the principle of protection of individual Charter equality rights, which is a legitimate objective. However, this objective faces the same competing
objectives and principles discussed in previous sections, not least of which is the competing
substantive equality rights of Indigenous peoples to be different and not have another government’s legal order imposed on them. But it is misleading and unhelpful (and treading into
dangerous stereotypes about Indigenous governments), to assume the protection of individual
rights is necessarily in conflict with the protection of Indigenous peoples’ collective equality
right to self-govern through their own legal orders. As highlighted in Chapter 2 of the Final
Report of the National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls,
Indigenous legal orders have always had concepts of both individual and collective rights,
roles and responsibilities.68 The Report emphasizes that the revitalization of Indigenous legal
orders informed by these concepts will go a long way towards rebuilding and strengthening
conditions of peace, safety, dignity and justice in Indigenous communities.69
In the case of VGFN, there is no evidence to suggest Ms. Dickson’s individual rights complaint could not be effectively addressed within the VGFN’s legal order. Indeed, the evidence
was quite the opposite: through extensive community discussion, VGFN had painstakingly
created an individual rights protection regime that aimed to balance individual protections
with communal rights. However, for reasons unsaid in the judgements, the Yukon courts were
unwilling to give priority to the VGFN’s legal order. Returning to the Doré-adapted Sparrow framework, there is a proportionality problem here. The fiduciary relationship between
Indigenous peoples and the Crown mandates that priority be given to the Aboriginal right in
issue. As here, when there is no credible evidence to suggest that the Indigenous nation is not
capable of addressing individual rights complaints within its legal order, its legal order ought
to be privileged over the Charter. We can alternatively frame this in minimal impairment
terms: privileging the Charter over the VGFN Constitution when VGFN have an established
individual rights protection regime within their legal order is not minimally impairing.

Conclusion
In this article, I have proposed an alternative framework for considering the application of
the Charter to VGFN. I propose this because the approach of the Yukon courts, which quickly
accepted Charter application to VGFN but sought to attenuate this through reading section
25 as partly ‘shielding’ the VGFN’s residency requirement from full section 15(1) Charter
scrutiny, is problematic. It unnecessarily subjected the VFGN’s legal order to Charter scrutiny,
which is assimilative because it imposes the Charter on the VGFN without their consent and
feeds into dangerous stereotypes about Indigenous governments. A more rigorous framework
is needed to assess questions of Charter application to Indigenous governments, particularly
because Canadian jurists tend to privilege the Charter given that many see it as a prized part
of our legal system.
My proposal draws on the section 35 Sparrow framework, first identifying the imposition of the Charter on VGFN as a prima facie infringement of their right to self-government.
68 Ibid at 129.
69 Ibid at 139-180.
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Next, adapting the Sparrow framework to apply to judge-made decisions, I propose that a
court would need to identify the objectives or principles in favour of applying the Charter and
engage in a proportional weighing of these against the competing objectives and principles at
play.
In the circumstances, the competing reasons for not applying the Charter outweigh the
reasons for applying the Charter. It is not necessary to apply the Charter to VGFN to respect
section 52 of the Constitution Act. Far from contravening section 52, privileging VGFN’s legal
order in the circumstances aligns with substantive equality, the principles of federalism, the
protection of minorities, the rule of law and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples. Concerns of creating a ‘legal vacuum’ here, or that VGFN’s legal order cannot address human rights complaints are equally unsupported. As VGFN has an established
individual rights protection regime within their Constitution, this should be given priority.
Practically speaking, respecting the VGFN Constitution here would see the Yukon courts
applying Part IV of the VGFN Constitution to Ms. Dickson’s complaint instead of the Charter.
While this prospect might feel strange or perhaps even uncomfortable to Canadian judges,
this is part of reconciliation. This is part of Canadian judges’ duty to learn and duty to act.
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